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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHARLEEN M. McREYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Case No. 890172-CA 
vs. 
GLENN L. McREYNOLDS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an Order and Judgment arising out of 
a bench trial held May 18, 1988. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 
1988). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Based upon equitable principles, did the trial court 
appropriately determine that since the minor children had been 
adequately provided for by Plaintiff/Appellant and had 
purposefully and intentionally frustrated the efforts by 
Defendant/Respondent to exercise his right of visitation was it 
appropriate for the District Court not to award judgment for the 
unpaid amount of child support based upon Defendant's actions in 
frustrating visitation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings. This is an 
action upon Plaintiff's Petition filed August 4, 1986, to recover 
unpaid child support from the Defendant (R. 55). 
In a bench trial, the trial court found that the unpaid 
child support for the period August 1986 through May 1988 was the 
sum of $3,520.00 (R.284). The Court also found, however, that 
Plaintiff and her current husband purposefully intimidated the 
Defendant and frustrated his attempts to visit with his children 
by repeatedly changing their address and telephone number. 
(R.284). 
The Court determined that during the period of time in 
question that the children were adequately supported by their 
mother and that this was not an action for the benefit of the 
children but for the benefit of the mother (R. 328). 
In light of the circumstances, it was the Court's opinion 
that the conduct of the Plaintiff would constitute contempt of 
the Court's Order relative to visitation and in structuring an 
equitable remedy, determined that it was appropriate not to grant 
Plaintiff judgment for the accrued child support (R. 327-328). 
Plaintiff then filed a Motion for New Trial or Amendment of 
Judgment on November 7, 1988 (R.298), which motion was denied by 
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the Court's Ruling of February 21, 1989 (R. 326). Plaintiff, 
thereafter, perfected this appeal which goes only to the issue of 
judgment for unpaid child support from August, 1986, through May, 
1988. 
B. Statement of Facts. The Plaintiff and Defendant in this 
case were divorced on March 7, 1984, pursuant to a Decree of 
Divorce entered in Evanston, Wyoming (R. 28). On June 29, 1984, 
an Order and Judgment was entered in Davis County, Utah, 
pertaining to those matters not adjudicated by the Wyoming 
Decree (R. 52-54). Those matters included the care, custody, and 
control of the minor children of the parties, visitation for the 
Defendant, child support, alimony, debts and division of marital 
property (R. 52-54). 
For purposes of this appeal, the only relevant time 
encompasses the period from August 4, 1986, through May, 1988. 
(See Appellant's brief page 2.) 
Subsequent to the trial, the Court, in its Findings of Fact, 
found that the accrued child support during the relevant period 
totaled $3,520 (R. 284 P.2). 
The trial court found it appropriate not to award judgment 
for said amount based upon its findings that the Plaintiff and 
her current husband 
purposefully intimidated the Defendant and frustrated 
his attempts to visit with his children by repeatedly 
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changing their address and telephone numbers, forcing 
calls about the children through Plaintiff's present 
husband and a law firm answering and forwarding 
facility and have not cooperated in meeting scheduled 
telephone calls from Defendant and the children as 
ordered by Domestic Relations Commissioner, all of 
which have caused Defendant considerable anxiety, 
expenditure of time and expense which could have been 
avoided by reasonable efforts on the part of the 
Plaintiff and her husband to afford him his visitation 
rights (R. 284, P. 3). 
The District Court, in its Ruling denying Plaintiff's Motion 
for New Trial, sheds further light on the basis for the Court's 
opinion. The Court specifically determined that there was no 
evidence presented that the children were not adequately 
supported during the relevant time and, therefore, concluded that 
the Petition for accrued child support payments was not an action 
for the benefit of the children but for the benefit of the 
mother (R. 328). The Court expressed the opinion that the 
conduct of Plaintiff would constitute a contempt of the Court's 
orders relative to visitation (R. 326-328). The Court further 
determined that it would be difficult to fashion a commensurate 
punishment for the wrong the Plaintiff had committed and 
determined that it was appropriate not to grant Plaintiff a 
judgment for the accrued child support (R. 326-328, Add. A). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant/Respondent does not take issue with Plaintiff's 
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arguments concerning the public policy and concern of insuring 
that children are properly supported by their parents. 
Respondent, however, stopped one step too short in their 
consideration of the issues at hand. The Court, in its Ruling on 
the Motion for a New Trial, attached as Addendum A, clearly 
determined that the children had adequately been provided for 
and, consequently, this was "not an action for the benefit of the 
children but for the benefit of the mother" (Addendum A). 
Once the Court has determined that the needs of the 
children have been adequately attended, the issue then becomes a 
question of whether the mother/Plaintiff should be entitled to 
recover the accrued child support payment when she has 
purposefully interfered with the father/Defendant's right to 
visitation as ordered by the Court. 
The Court, in fashioning a remedy based upon equitable 
principles, could not, in good conscience, award judgment which 
would go to the benefit of the mother as opposed to the children 
in light of her contemptuous actions. 
The Court, in considering the equitable principles stated: 
Whenever a party, who, as actor, seeks to set the 
judicial machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, 
has violated conscience, or good faith, or other 
equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the 
doors of the Court will be shut against him; the court 
will refuse to award him any remedy (Citation 
omitted) (R. 259-260). 
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For the reasons set out, the trial court properly structured 
a remedy based upon equitable principles to rectify the wrongs 
committed by Plaintiff, 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RELIEVED THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
FROM PAYMENT OF ACCRUED CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS. 
A. The Utah Supreme Court Has Declared that a Trial Court 
may Fashion Equitable Orders in Relation to Children 
and their Support as is Reasonable and Necessary. 
In light of several Utah Supreme Court cases, the issue of 
child support gives rise to the argument that the trial court has 
power to relieve a non-custodial parent of an obligation of 
accrued child support, when the custodial parent has thwarted the 
non-custodial parent's right to visitation. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated: 
Though it be conceded that under proper circumstances 
a court might make the payments for support money 
dependent upon a child's custodian making the child 
available for visitation rights, the right of a child 
to support is a paramount right which it possesses 
quite apart from any consideration relating to the 
conduct of its divorced parents (emphasis added). 
Earl vs. Earl, 17 Utah 2d 156, 406 P.2d 302 (1965). In Earl, the 
Court pointed out that child support may or may not properly be 
made contingent upon compliance with visitation rights. The 
decision is not automatic, but depends chiefly on the welfare of 
the children involved--their "paramount right to support." In 
fact, the Court in Earl ordered a hearing to determine whether 
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it would be desirable to ensure compliance with visitation 
rights, by making support payments dependent on those rights. 
Id. at 303. 
This reasoning is also supported in McClure vs. Powell, 15 
Utah 2d 324, 392 P.2d 624 (1964). In McClure, the non-custodial 
parent was not relieved from child support payments because he 
did not pursue that remedy in the proper forum. However, the 
Court did relieve him of the interest on the past due payments. 
Id. at 625. Thus, it is apparent that the courts may relieve a 
non-custodial parent from past due installments if that parent 
takes action in the proper forum. This equitable power has been 
recognized in the following cases as well. Baker vs. Baker, 224 
P.2d 192 (Utah 1950); Forbush vs. Forbush, 578 P.2d 518 (Utah 
1928); Owen vs. Owen, 579 P.2d 911 (Utah 1978). 
This same argument is also supported in more recent cases. 
In 1988, the Court of Appeals of Utah decided Kelly vs. Draney/ 
754 P. 2d 92 (1988). In Kelly, the mother sought unpaid child 
support from the father, and the father sought to enforce the 
visitation provisions of the divorce decree. _Id. at 92. The 
Court held that: 
. . .2) trial court properly found mother in contempt 
for thwarting father's visitation rights, and 3) 
remand was required for trial court to make findings 
with respect to how offset of husband's unpaid child 
support obligation was applied against contempt fine 
or assessment against mother. 
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Id. at 92. 
Hence, the Court in Kelly, did not prohibit the lower court 
from offsetting the father's unpaid child support against the 
mother's contemptuous acts in disallowing his right to 
visitation. In fact, the Court concluded their opinion by 
stating: 
We emphasize that we do not intend by these 
suggestions to restrict the trial court from making 
any orders regarding the children and his parents that 
it may deem appropriate in this proceeding or in any 
other (emphasis added). 
2jd. at 96. 
In the present case, Plaintiff-Appellant's conduct would 
constitute contempt of the Court's orders with regard to 
visitation. And, while this is not a contempt proceeding, the 
cases above outlined support the argument that the trial court 
has the power to make the equitable decision to relieve the 
Defendant of his unpaid child support if it deems it appropriate. 
This, of course, involves taking into consideration the welfare 
of the children and their right to support. 
B. Foregoing an Accrued Child Support Obligation is Not 
Improper Per Se, but Depends on the Welfare of the 
Children Involved. 
In deciding whether or not to order or enforce certain child 
support payments, scores of Utah cases have held the children's 
welfare and their right to support as paramount: 
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Both parents have an obligation to support their 
children. A child's right to that support is 
paramount. Hills vs. Hills, Utah 638 P.2d 516 (1981); 
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, U.C.A., 1953, 
Section 78-45-3, -4, as amended. However, it does not 
necessarily follow that in every instance the non-
custodial parent must pay child support to the other 
parent. The trial court may fashion such equitable 
orders in relation to the children and their support 
as is reasonable and necessary, considering not only 
the needs of the children, but also the ability of the 
parent to pay. Anderson vs. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 
172 P.2d 132 (1946); U.C.A., 1953, Section 30-3-5, as 
amended. 
Woodward vs. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985). 
The Supreme Court in Race vs. Race, 740 P. 2d 253 (Utah 
1987), points out the necessity of considering the child's 
welfare. The facts in Race are of particular interest and 
importance. In Race, the trial court made a supplemental order 
that the children undergo therapy at Primary Children's Hospital 
and that visitation be integrated into that therapy when 
professional opinion deemed it appropriate. At the same time, 
the Court conditioned payment of child support upon the 
development of a visitation schedule. :id. at 256. In the 
context of these facts, the Supreme Court stated: 
Court-ordered child support is an obligation imposed 
for the benefit of the children, not the divorcing 
spouse. We find no circumstances here which justifies 
the trial court in deferring support until visitation 
between the children and their father could be worked 
out. In the interim, they needed and were entitled to 
his support. Id. at 256. 
The decision in Race is not at all inconsistent with the 
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trial court's ruling in the present case. Rather, focusing on 
the children's need and welfare in each case, the two opinions 
are completely in accord. In Race, the children were ordered to 
undergo intensive therapy, which is extremely expensive, and was, 
in the Court's opinion, necessary. Thus, the husband's support 
payments were greatly needed, such that conditioning them on the 
development of a visitation schedule was interfering with the 
children's needs. 
The trial court's decision in the present case, however, has 
not jeopardized the children's welfare. The Plaintiff is married 
to an attorney who earns between $35,000 to $40,000 per year. 
The Plaintiff is also capable of earning substantial income as a 
realtor. Moreover, the Plaintiff presented no evidence that her 
minor children were inadequately supported during the time when 
support was not paid. Nor was there any evidence that the State 
of Utah or any public agency had to provide support, or that any 
debt was incurred by the Plaintiff or her new husband as a result 
of Defendant's non-payment. Moreover, the Plaintiff deliberately 
interfered with the Defendant's visitation rights. Thus, in the 
present case, the trial court did not overlook or ignore the 
"children's paramount right to and need for support." Rather, 
the Court, taking into consideration the Plaintiff's contemptuous 
acts, as well as the children's welfare, merely used its 
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equitable powers to formulate a fair solution. Awarding child 
support in arrears would be a windfall to the Plaintiff, not a 
needed benefit to the children. 
C. There is an Important Distinction Between Accrued Child 
Support and future Child Support-- the two Must be 
Analyzed Independently, 
Many Utah Supreme Court cases distinguish between accrued 
child support and future child support. In Peterson vs. 
Peterson, 530 P. 2d 821 (Utah 1974), the custodial mother was 
found in contempt for failure to comply with the visitation 
provisions of the divorce decree, and the husband's obligation to 
provide support was suspended. On appeal, the Court vacated the 
order and ordered the husband to begin paying the accrued child 
support plus interest which amounted to $11,600. However, the 
Supreme Court ultimately held that the contempt order and the 
suspension of child support were proper. Id. at 821. In 
explaining their decision, the Court quoted from Mr. Justice 
Crockett's concurring opinion in Wallis vs. Wallis, 9 Utah 2d 
237, 342 P.2d 103 (1959): 
The support of the provision for alimony and support 
money is to provide for the current needs, and not 
allow the beneficiary to sit by and permit a 
burdensome debt to accumulate and then use it to 
harass the defendant. 
Peterson vs. Peterson, 530 P. 2d 821 (Utah 1974) (quoting Wallis 
vs. Wallis, 9 Utah 2d 237, 342 P. 2d 103 (1959). Counsel for 
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Defendant is not asserting that the Plaintiff, in the present 
case, deliberately permitted the debt to accumulate in order to 
harass the Defendant at a later time. However, allowing the 
Plaintiff to collect the accrual of $3,500 when there has been no 
apparent need or any debts incurred by the Plaintiff as a result 
of the Defendant's nonpayment, would accomplish nothing more than 
to harass the Defendant. 
Other jurisdictions also support the cancelation of child 
support in arrears due to interference with visitation rights, 
provided that the children's welfare is not put in jeopardy. 
Clayton vs. Clayton, *** Fla. App. ***, 380 So. 2d 1143 (1980); 
Chazen vs. Chazen, 107 Mich. App. 485, 309 N.W. 2d 613; Hudson 
vs. Hudson, 412 N.Y.S. 2d 242 (1978); O'Neill vs. O'Neill, 457 
N.Y.S. 2d 101 (A.D. 1982); Cooper vs. Cooper, 375 N.E. 2d 925 
(111. App. 1978). 
This distinction is also consistent with the Supreme Court's 
decision in Race vs. Race, 740 P. 2d 253 (Utah 1987). In Race, 
the lower court had simultaneously given a support order and 
conditioned its payment upon development of a visitation 
schedule. Id. at 256. This order, in effect, conditioned future 
support payments (not past) upon cooperation with visitation 
rights. It is this order that the Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded. 
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The Supreme Court of Wyoming has also distinguished between 
past and future support. In Broyles vs. Broyles, 711 P. 2d 1119 
(Wyo. 1985), the Supreme Court in stating the issues properly 
before the Court, made a distinction between child support 
arrearages and future child support: 
Appellee has not perfected an appeal to this court 
and, therefore, we will not address whether the denial 
of visitation privileges is a defense to an action for 
child-support arrearages (emphasis added). 
Id. at 1123. 
Hence, the Court did not address the issue of accrued child 
support, not because it was improper per se, but because the 
father had not filed a necessary cross-appeal. Only later in 
their discussion of future child support, did the Court state the 
following: 
While many older cases hold to the contrary, the 
modern view is that the denial of visitation rights by 
the custodial parent or the child does not constitute 
a change in circumstances which justifies the 
reduction or termination of the noncustodial parent's 
support obligation. 
Id. at 1127. 
Thus, denial of visitation privileges, as a general rule, 
might not be a defense to an action for future child support. 
However, denial of such privileges has been and properly can be a 
defense to an action for child support in arrears if, in the 
Court's discretion, it is equitable and would not adversely 
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affect the children's welfare. The distinction between past and 
future support is sound for one main reason: a court, with the 
luxury of hindsight, is capable of examining the actions of the 
divorced parents as well as the past needs of the children, and 
whether those needs have been met. However, attempting to 
condition parent's acts on the future needs of the children, as 
did the Court in Race, puts an undue risk on the children's 
welfare. The decision of the trial court accounts for the 
children's welfare and yet prevents a windfall to the Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly exercised its equitable powers by 
relieving the Defendant from the accrued child support of 
$3,560.00. Current Utah case law holds the children's right to 
support as paramount. However, the cases do not hold that a 
custodial parent may deliberately interfere with a non-custodial 
parent's right to visitation and automatically receive all unpaid 
child support. The trial court has the power to protect the 
welfare of the children and, at the same time, to prevent an 
inequitable windfall to either parent. Therefore, Defendant-
Respondent respectfully requests that the decision of the trial 
court be affirmed and that the Defendant be relieved from payment 
of $3,520 in unpaid child support. 
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DATED this •<&_ day of July, 1989. 
RICHARD B. JOHNSON 
Attorney for Plaintixf 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the , <3S~ day of 
1989, I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing to 
the following, postage prepaid. 
Mr. D. David Lambert 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
•^u^ s. ^^ 
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ADDENDUM 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
tf
'4tf 
D. DAVID LAMBERT, (1872) for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-6345 
Our File No. 18,889 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHARLEEN M. McREYNOLDS 
aka SHARLEEN COLTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GLENN L. McREYNOLDS, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR 
AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. CV-87-352 
Judge George E. Ballif 
Plaintiff, through her counsel, hereby moves the Court to open this judgment, 
amend the Conclusions of Law and direct the entry of a new judgment on the single 
issue of the delinquent child support during the period August, 1986 through May, 1988. 
This motion does not involve receiving any new evidence. 
This motion is made pursuant to Rule 59(a), U.R.CP. and is accompanied by a 
supporting memorandum of points and authorities. 
DATED this _£ day of November, 1988. 
b. 
D. DAVfD LAMB 
HOWARD, LEWIS &. PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
-*Wll 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to 
the following, postage prepaid, this 1""^ day of November, 1988. 
Mr. Richard B. Johnson 
Jackman and Johnson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1327 South 800 East #300 
Orem, UT 84058 
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